

General Alex Bolling phoned Deputy Director on 30 April and asked if it was all right not to answer Memo for ID dtd 20 Apr. He said they admit they "loused it up and didn't do it right at all". He said they had set up a new system and the mistake will not be repeated. General Wright agreed no answer to memo was necessary.

J.G.

SECRET

Army review(s) completed.

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CSGID 092

14 Apr 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING CHIEF, ESTIMATES GROUP, ONE, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCYSUBJECT: The Current Situation in the Free Territory of Trieste
(ORK 23-48)The Intelligence Division desires that the following dissent
be published with the paper:

"The Intelligence Division, Department of the Army dissents with the paper as written. The assumption is implicit throughout the text, and partly expressed on page 1, that the whole international dispute over Trieste has been and is a question only of prestige between East and West. The intrinsic importance of Trieste as a strategic military asset to its possessor is ignored.

This division believes that, while the strategic importance of the Trieste area should not be overemphasized, it must, nevertheless, be taken into account as a material factor in the struggle between East and West for control of the area. In any Soviet-Yugoslav military operation into northern Italy, advance use of the excellent port facilities and superior communications with the Danubian valley afforded by physical possession of the city of Trieste, together with the terrain advantages, would make it possible to assemble a large force with good logistic support as well as to make naval preparations in the Adriatic to a much greater extent than would be possible with the present demarkation line or the present frontier. These advantages would enable the Eastern bloc to accelerate its overrunning of northern Italy and its eventual control of the entire Italian peninsula, to the detriment of any planned counteraction by the western countries.

Short of war, possession of Trieste would give the Eastern bloc an opportunity to intensify pressure on Italy in the same proportion as the enhanced military capabilities described above."

/s/

CARTER W. CLARKE
Carter W. Clarke
Colonel, G.S.C.
Q. S. I. S. O. D. Director of Intelligence